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I. Introduction
Most industrialized countries follow a strategy of treating potential immigrants dif-
ferentiated according to their skills, with an emphasis on keeping back low skilled
immigration on the one hand, and attracting high skilled labor on the other hand.
This differentiation is rationalized by the expected fiscal and employment conse-
quences: Apart from the downward pressure on wages due to increased labor market
competition, successful low skilled immigrants are feared to drive natives into un-
employment, while those migrants who do not find a job impose a net fiscal burden
on the welfare state. Highly qualified individuals, in contrast, are regarded not only
as fiscal contributors but also as means to stimulate the labor market and hence the
employment prospects of the less skilled.
However, these fiscal and employment effects of labor mobility have been explored
predominantly in isolation. On the one hand, the vast majority of studies linking
immigration and the welfare state relies on the framework of fully competitive labor
markets, and thus abstracts from the pressing problem of unemployment faced by
many welfare states.1 On the other hand, approaches incorporating labor market
frictions disregard either the existence of unemployment or unemployment insurance
(Razin and Sadka, 1995, Dolado et al., 1996, Fuest and Thum, 2000) or budgetary
repercussions (Brecher and Choudri, 1987, Schmidt et al., 1994). On top of that,
the effects of high skilled immigration have received little attention in the literature
hitherto.
Therefore, this paper tackles the issue from a more comprehensive perspective, ex-
amining the effects of both high and low skilled immigration on a host economy
suffering from unemployment due to the existence of trade unions and an unem-
ployment insurance scheme. The resulting interplay between the qualifications of
immigrants, the wage setting process and the unemployment insurance scheme al-
lows to disentangle some novel effects. We show that the labor market ramifications
are characterized by the production technology of the host country. In particular,
direction and strength of employment effects are determined by the elasticity of sub-
stitution between high and low skilled labor. When this elasticity exceeds unity, as
suggested by many empirical studies (Johnson, 1997), inputs are close substitutes,
1 Examples include Wildasin (1994), Razin and Sadka (1995), Wellisch and Walz (1998), Michael
and Hatzipanayotou (2001) and Michael (2003).
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and low skilled immigration leads to a more than proportional increase in low skilled
employment, while high skilled immigration reduces low skilled employment. How-
ever, when inputs are close complements, high skilled immigration promotes low
skilled employment and low skilled immigration increases the low skilled unemploy-
ment rate.
These findings translate into some important consequences for the assessment of
immigration policies. For a high degree of substitutability between skills, low skilled
immigrants can increase the total income accruing to the native population whereas
high skilled immigrants have an adverse effect. Moreover, low skilled immigration
may enhance the labor market prospects so much that the expected utility of a
native low skilled increases. Therefore, the host country may achieve a Pareto-
improvement by allowing low skilled labor to migrate in. By driving the low skilled
into unemployment and reducing the high skilled wage, high skilled immigration
may make all those already in the country worse off. However, this pattern reverses
for close complementarity between inputs.
To the best of our knowledge, these findings have not been derived before. Schmidt
et al. (1994) find low skilled immigration to have no effect on the wage set by a
rent-maximizing trade union. However, that model neglects any fiscal repercussions
of immigration by renouncing on a balanced budget restriction for the welfare state,
allowing both the contribution rate and the unemployment benefit to remain con-
stant. Dolado et al. (1996) derive a sufficient condition for low skilled immigration
to have a positive effect on the level of low skilled employment. While these authors
show that this condition is the more likely to be fulfilled, the better inputs can be
substituted, they consider neither the effects on unemployment rates nor native in-
comes and welfare. Fuest and Thum (2000) find ambiguous effects of immigration
on total native income for a dual labor market with homogenous labor. In their
model, increases in native income originate in a significant reallocation of workers
from the unionized to the competitive sector in a full employment setting, with the
strength of the reallocation depending on the production functions of both sectors.2
2 Kemnitz (2003) uses a model related to the one presented here in order to scrutinize the thesis
that low skilled immigration makes the native population better off due to the existence of
unfunded old age security (Razin and Sadka, 2000). However, refining to a Cobb-Douglas
production function, that approach assumes away the important role of the host country’s
technology.
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Both Ortega (2000) and Epstein and Hillman (2003) have presented circumstances
under which immigration can be Pareto-improving. However, these mechanisms dif-
fer substantially from the one advanced here. In Ortega (2000), positive effects arise
from enhancing the matching probability between workers and firms. The argument
by Epstein and Hillman (2003) rests on the existence of labor market discrimination
against immigrants in an efficiency-wage model: although the overall unemployment
rate rises, natives enjoy a higher probability to capture a job. Without such discrim-
ination, natives necessarily lose. In the present model, however, beneficial effects
arise from a reduction in the low skilled unemployment rate being to the benefit of
both natives and immigrants.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II derives the labor market equilibrium
of the host economy. Section III addresses the effects of high and low skilled immi-
gration on the labor market and the economic position of natives. Section IV offers
some concluding remarks.
II. The Host Economy
Consider an economy where the single output good is produced by two inputs, called
high and low skilled labor H and L, according to a constant-elasticity-of substitution
production function:
Y = [αHρ + (1− α)Lρ] 1ρ , (1)
with ρ < 1 and α ∈ (1
2
, 1), because higher skills are more productive. As is well
known, this formulation represents a number of popular production functions like
perfect substitutes (ρ → 1), perfect complements (ρ → −∞) or the Cobb-Douglas
(ρ = 0).3 For further analysis, it is convenient to adopt the usual classification of
calling high and low skilled labor close substitutes when ρ > 0 and close complements
when ρ < 0.4 For ρ = 0, inputs are neither close substitutes nor complements. A
3 We omit the polar case ρ = 1 for two reasons. First, when workers are perfect substitutes, it
may be hard to justify that the low skilled are unionized while the high skilled are not. Second,
the wage elasticity of the demand for low skilled labor would be −∞. Degenerating the tradeoff
between wages and employment presented below, unemployment could never be an equilibrium
outcome for such an economy.
4 In a related study, Schmidt et al. (1994) distinguish between high and low skilled labor being
q-complements, where the marginal productivity of low skilled labor increases in the quantity
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number of recent studies (Johnson, 1997; Fitzenberger, 1999; Card and Lemieux,
2001) indicates close substitutability to be the empirically more relevant case with
ρ averaging around 1/3. However, as estimates show some variation (see, e.g., the
collection of results in Hamermesh, 1993), we examine all possible cases for ρ.
The native population consists of both high and low skilled workers NH and NL,
respectively. Immigrants are either high or low skilled, arrive in amounts MH and
ML and are identical to the natives in all respects. With any objective reason for
discrimination lacking, it is reasonable to presume that immigrants face the same
labor market prospects as the low skilled natives.5
Firms hire both factors according to the marginal productivity conditions:
∂Y
∂H
= [αHρ + (1− α)Lρ] 1ρ−1 αHρ−1 = wH , (2)
∂Y
∂L
= [αHρ + (1− α)Lρ] 1ρ−1 (1− α)Lρ−1 = wL. (3)
The high skilled labor market is perfectly competitive, hence the wage wH adjusts
such that this type of labor is fully employed: H = NH +MH . Low skilled labor,
however, is unionized. Thus, the low skilled wage wL results from bargains between
trade unions and firms. In accordance with most of the literature, we assume that
both unions and firms are so small that they neglect macroeconomic repercussions
of their behavior.
Instead of committing to one of the standard formulations of wage setting in union-
ized markets, we model the negotiation process in a rather flexible way. Inspired by
Pencavel (1984), we assume that the bargained wage maximizes a weighted surplus
of per capita net income and employment, compared to the reference situation. As
bargaining partners are small relative to the economy, the reference situation corre-
sponds to no employment in that firm and all workers receive the alternative income
w¯, to be presented in detail below. Thus, the wage negotiation surplus is:
Ω = γ log[(1− τ)wL − w¯] + (1− γ) log(1− pi)L, (4)
of high skilled labor employed, and q-substitutes, where the opposite holds. This should not be
confused with the above definition. It is easy to verify that high and low skilled labor must be
q-complements in (1) (Hamermesh, 1993).
5 In general, arguments for both better and inferior labor market chances for immigrants can
be made. The vast majority of the theoretical literature considers natives and immigrants as
identical, see e.g. Schmidt et al., (1994), Razin and Sadka (1995), Fuest and Thum (2000),
Casarico and Devillanova (2003).
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where γ ∈ [0, 1
2
] captures the relative priority of income over employment, τ denotes
the contribution/ tax rate to unemployment insurance, and L is determined by (3),
with the fraction pi > 0 of these jobs to be occupied by workers from outside the
home firm. This labor market turnover could be justified by various arguments not
really crucial for the results. We offer the interpretation of Kaas and von Thadden
(2001) according to which some home workers turn out to be unproductive at their
workplace for reasons not explicitly modelled and are replaced by outside appli-
cants.6 For further reference, we denote the first term in (4) as the income rent and
the second term as the employment rent.7
This wage negotiation function covers the most relevant situations advanced in the
literature. The case γ = 1
2
corresponds to the maximization of the income of the low
skilled, that is rent maximization. When γ = 0, only employment matters, because
of either a very low bargaining power or a very high employment preference on part
of the union. Other values of γ reflect intermediate cases.
It should be stressed that (4) need not necessarily be identified as the target function
of trade union members. Rather, it depicts the total rent gained by both union
representatives and firm managements from wage negotiations given the economy’s
formal or informal labor market institutions. We therefore treat unions and firms
as an entity, and refer to them as wage setters. One implication of this approach
is that the negotiated wage may fail to maximize low skilled utility not only due
to low union power, but also because of a divergence of interests between union
representatives and members.
Differentiating (4) with respect to wL leads to the first-order condition:
8
γ(1− τ)wL
(1− τ)wL − w¯ + (1− γ)ε = 0, (5)
where ε is the wage elasticity of labor demand.
6 A similar turnover could be introduced for the high skilled as well without affecting any of our
findings.
7 We assume that trade setters care for immigrants as much as they do for natives. This assump-
tion is common in the literature (Fuest and Thum, 2000) and seems plausible in the light of the
perfect congruency of immigrant and native low skilled. But even only the well-being of native
workers counted (Schmidt et al., 1994), the wage setting relation derived below would remain
unchanged.
8 The restriction γ ≤ 1/2 ensures that the respective second-order condition is fulfilled, so (5)
describes always a maximum of the wage setters’ objective.
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The optimal choice of wage setters is characterized by the equalization of the marginal
gains and costs of increasing the low skilled wage. Put differently, the marginal in-
come rent γ(1− τ)wL/((1− τ)wL− w¯) and the marginal employment rent −(1−γ)ε
coincide. Rearranging (5) shows that the net wage can be expressed as a markup
(1 − γ)ε/(γ + (1 − γ)ε) on the alternative wage, which depends negatively on the
elasticity of labor demand. Incentive compatibility requires that markup to exceed
unity, which implies that wage setters’ choices must be located in a sufficiently elastic
part of the demand curve for low skilled labor: ε < − γ
1−γ .
For the following analysis, it is useful to write this elasticity as a function of relative
factor endowments and the low skilled unemployment rate u = (NL+ML−L)/(NL+
ML):
ε =
αHρ + (1− α)Lρ
(ρ− 1)αHρ =
1 + 1−α
α
(
(1−u)(NL+ML)
NH+MH
)ρ
ρ− 1 . (6)
An increase in low skilled employment (a ceteris paribus increase NL or ML or a
decrease of u) decreases (increases) this elasticity when inputs are close substitutes
(complements), and leaves ε constant for the Cobb-Douglas case:
∂ε
∂NL
=
∂ε
∂ML
= − 1− u
NL +ML
∂ε
∂u
(7)
=
ρ
ρ− 1
(1− α)
α(NL +ML)
(
(1− u)(NL +ML)
NH +MH
)ρ
Q 0⇐⇒ ρ Q 0.
An increase in high skilled employment has just the opposite effect:
∂ε
∂H
= − ∂ε
∂NL
(1− u)(NL +ML)
NH +MH
R 0⇐⇒ ρ R 0. (8)
In the aggregate, a pool of NL +ML − (1 − pi)L low skilled workers does not get
a job in the home firm and applies abroad to earn an expected gross wage EwL,
if successful. Since there are piL vacancies, the probability of getting such a job,
conditional on not being hired at the home firm is
ξ(u) =
piL
NL +ML − (1− pi)L =
pi(1− u)
1− (1− pi)(1− u) ,
with ξ′(u) < 0, ξ(0) = 1 and ξ(1) = 0. When applications are unsuccessful, which
occurs with the residual probability 1−ξ(u), workers rely on unemployment benefits.
As a consequence, the alternative wage corresponds to:
w¯ = ξ(u)(1− τ)EwL + (1− ξ(u))b. (9)
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The welfare state provides support to all unemployed workers. Benefits are financed
by charging all earnings at the rate τ , leading to the government budget constraint:
b(NL +ML − L) = τwLL+ τwHH. (10)
Thus, the welfare state is outright redistributive, as the high skilled contribute to
the system although they do not face any unemployment risk.
With respect to the choice of the unemployment benefit level, we assume that the
government is guided by two countervailing concerns: on the one hand, it wants to
maintain a constant net replacement ratio, on the other hand, the cost of maintaining
that protection are taken into account. This tradeoff is captured in the following
relationship:
b = r(τ)(1− τ)wL, (11)
with r(0) = r0 ≥ 0, r(τ ∗) = 0 with τ ∗ < 1, r′(τ) ≤ 0 for τ ∈ [0, τ ∗] and r′(τ) = 0
for τ ∈ [τ ∗, 1]. Thus, the effective ratio between benefit and net wage - if positive -
is a decreasing function of the contribution rate. While too high contribution rates
(τ > τ ∗) are never acceptable for the state, r0 is a measure of the general orientation
towards the interests of the unemployed. r0 = 0 obviously rules out the existence of
a welfare state.
Using this dependency, (2) and (3) and the definition of the low skilled unemploy-
ment rate, the government budget constraint results as:
BB = r(τ)− τ
1− τ
1− u
u
[
1 +
α
1− α
(
H
(1− u)(NL +ML)
)ρ]
= 0, (12)
while, because all firms are identical (EwL = wL), the wage setting relation becomes:
WS =
γ
(1− ξ(u))(1− r(τ)) + (1− γ)ε = 0, (13)
with the first term denoting the economy-wide marginal income rent. The equi-
librium of the host economy is thus given by (12) and (13), with the low skilled
unemployment rate u and the contribution rate τ being the endogenous variables.
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Proposition 1. For every r0 < 1, there exists at least one stable labor market
equilibrium with some low skilled unemployment.
Proof. (12) is continuously increasing in (u, τ)-space, with τ = 0 if u = 0 and
τ = 1 when u = 1. (13) is a continuous function in the interval [u, 1], where u is
the solution to γ/(1 − ξ(u)) = −(1 − γ)ε. Since ξ(0) = 1 and ε is finite for all
u < 1, u > 0. Along WS, we have τ = 1 for u = u and τ < 1 for u = 1. Therefore,
at least one intersection of both curves in the interval [u, 1) must exist. ¤
While the welfare state budget establishes a stable positive link between the tax
rate and the low skilled unemployment rate ( dτ
du
∣∣
BB
= −(dBB/du)/(dBB/dτ) > 0),
the behavior of the wage setting relation turns out to depend on the elasticity of
substitution:
dτ
du
∣∣∣∣
WS
= −dWS/du
dWS/dτ
=
(<0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
γξ′(u)/[(1− ξ(u))2(1− r(τ))] +
R0⇐⇒ ρR0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− γ)∂ε/∂u
−γr′(τ)/[(1− ξ(u))(1− r(τ))2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(>0)
. (14)
When inputs are not close substitutes (ρ ≤ 0), (14) is negative, implying the unique-
ness of equilibrium. This is not ensured for ρ > 0, since ∂ε/∂u > 0 may render the
wage setting relation increasing in (u, τ)-space at least in a range. Nevertheless,
as r(1) = 0 and ε < −γ/(1 − γ), full unemployment is compatible only with a
contribution rate smaller than unity. Therefore, WS crosses BB at least once from
above in (u, τ)-space, establishing the existence of at least one stable equilibrium for
all ρ. In what follows, we assume throughout that the economy is in such a stable
equilibrium, which means that the determinant of the system:
|D| = ∂WS
∂u
∂BB
∂τ
− ∂BB
∂u
∂WS
∂τ
has a positive sign. Only if this condition is fulfilled, will an increase in r0 have the
expected effect of reducing low skilled employment:
du
dr0
=
1
|D|
γ r(τ)
(1− ξ(u))(1− r(τ))2(1− τ)τ R 0 ⇐⇒ |D| R 0. (15)
One interesting feature of the model is the existence of equilibrium unemployment
even in the absence of a social safety net. This must be the case because, whatever
the level of r0, full employment implies the equality of bargained and alternative
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earnings. However, this would generate an infinitely high marginal income rent
which can never result from a wage setters’ optimal choice, since the marginal em-
ployment rent is finite for u = 0.
Therefore, for r0 = 0, the fraction u of low skilled, characterized by:
γ(1− (1− pi)(1− u0))
(1− γ)u0 =
1 + 1−α
α
(
(1−u0)(NL+ML)
NH+MH
)ρ
1− ρ ,
does not get a job in equilibrium. This minimum unemployment rate is the higher,
the higher the degree of labor market turnover pi and the more income matters in
the wage bargain (the higher γ).
III. The Effects of Immigration
How do inflows of high and low skilled labor affect the host economy? This sec-
tion answers this question in detail, distinguishing between the consequences on
unemployment, the welfare state budget and the economic position of natives.
Labor Market Consequences
Starting with the employment effect of low skilled immigrants, differentiation of the
system (12)-(13) with respect to ML yields:
Proposition 2. Low skilled immigration increases total low skilled employment and
decreases the low skilled wage. It decreases (increases) the low skilled unemployment
rate if and only if high and low skilled labor are close substitutes (complements).
Proof. The second part of the proposition follows from Cramer’s Rule:
du
dML
=
(R0⇐⇒ ρR0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
−∂WS
∂ML
(<0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂BB
∂τ
+
(R0⇐⇒ ρR0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂BB
∂ML
(<0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂WS
∂τ
|D|︸︷︷︸
(>0)
Q 0 ⇐⇒ ρ R 0. (16)
The effect on total low skilled employment is thus:
dL
dML
= (1− u)− du
dML
(NL +ML), (17)
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which is positive if and only if du
dML
< (1−u)/(NL+ML). Using (16), this condition
is equivalent to:
∂WS
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(<0)
[
∂BB
∂ML
+
1− u
NL +ML
∂BB
∂u
]
<
∂BB
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(<0)
[
∂WS
∂ML
+
1− u
NL +ML
∂WS
∂u
]
. (18)
Since
∂BB
∂ML
+
1− u
NL +ML
∂BB
∂u
=
1− u
u2(NL +ML)
τ
1− τ (1 +
α
1− α
(
H
L
)ρ
) > 0,
∂WS
∂ML
+
1− u
NL +ML
∂WS
∂u
=
γξ′(u)(1− u)
(1− ξ(u))2(1− r(τ))(NL +ML) < 0,
(18) is always fulfilled. Because of (3), an employment increase must be accompanied
by a wage decrease.¤
The first part of the proposition is driven by the increase in the low skilled workers’
pool. Putting a fiscal strain on the welfare state and diminishing the probability of
getting a job outside the home sector, low skilled immigration reduces the marginal
income rent. Wage setters with wage cuts raising total employment.9 Thus, unlike
a number of previous studies (Razin and Sadka, 1995, Schmidt et al., 1994), wages
are flexible despite the presence of unemployment.
The strength of the employment effect, however, is determined by the production
structure of the host economy. Consider as reference the Cobb-Douglas case (ρ = 0),
where both (12) and (13) do not depend on the level of low skilled employment
but only on the unemployment rate. Inspection of (12) shows that the effective
replacement ratio can be sustained with a constant τ for a proportional employment
increase. At the same time, that employment increase just balances marginal income
and employment rents for a constant contribution rate. Hence both curves remain
unaltered in (u, τ)-space and the equilibrium unemployment rate does not change.
When high and low skilled labor are close substitutes (ρ > 0), however, an increase
in total low skilled employment decreases the high skilleds’ income share and hence
their relative fiscal contribution. As budget balance can be restored only by an
increase in the contribution rate for a given unemployment rate, or, equivalently,
by a more than proportional employment increase for given τ , this shifts the BB-
curve upwards in (u, τ)-space. Moreover, the marginal employment rent becomes an
9 Adverse, but small effects of immigration on low skilled wages are found in a number of empirical
studies, see, e.g. DeNew and Zimmermann (1994).
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increasing function of the employment level ( dε
dML
< 0), leading to a shift of the WS
curve: for a proportional employment increase, the marginal income rent falls short
of the marginal employment rent. Hence, marginal rents are equalized by a higher
rise in employment. In a sense, low skilled immigrants reduce the relative price of
employment in wage setters’ objectives: The higher the degree of substitutability,
the less income has to be sacrificed in order to achieve a given employment increase,
and hence the more jobs are generated. For ρ > 0, the elasticity of low skilled
labor is decreasing in total low skilled employment. Hence, employment increases
can be created by smaller and smaller wage reductions, such that the terms of trade
between income and employment shift continuously towards the latter.10 Thus,
the WS-curve shifts downward in (u, τ)-space, which reinforces the reduction in u
brought about by the shift of BB. Note that either of the two shifts is sufficient for
low skilled immigration to decrease the low skilled unemployment rate.
The less than proportional employment effect of low skilled immigration for ρ < 0
can be explained by the same line of reasoning. First, as the high skilled bear an
increasing part of welfare state contributions, a less than proportional employment
increase suffices to fulfill the budget balance restriction for given τ . Consequently,
the BB-curve shifts downwards. Second, job creation becomes increasingly costly in
terms of wage income as low skilled labor becomes less elastic, implying an upward
shift of the WS-curve. Either shift generates a rise of the low skilled unemployment
rate.
Turning to the effects of high skilled immigrants, we find:
Proposition 3. An inflow of high skilled workers decreases (increases) total low
skilled employment if and only if high and low skilled labor are close substitutes
(complements).
Proof. Total low skilled employment reacts according to:
dL
dMH
= − du
dMH
(NL +ML), (19)
10 This finding differs significantly from a result derived by Schmidt et al. (1994), where native
unemployment increases the less with immigration, the higher the degree of complementarity
between high and low skilled labor. However, that result relies upon the assumption of the
union being interested in the well being of the high skilled.
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the sign of which is determined by:
du
dMH
=
(Q0⇐⇒ ρR0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
−∂WS
∂MH
(<0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂BB
∂τ
+
(Q0⇐⇒ ρR0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂BB
∂MH
(<0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂WS
∂τ
|D|︸︷︷︸
(>0)
R 0 ⇐⇒ ρ R 0.¤ (20)
The economic mechanisms behind this result resemble those presented above and are
discussed in some detail for the case ρ > 0. The increase in high skilled employment
makes the demand for low skilled labor less elastic. Thus low skilled employment
becomes more costly in terms of income, raising wage demands for a given contri-
bution rate. This upward shift of the WS-curve in (u, τ)-space is accompanied by a
upward shift of BB: The new high skilled improve the fiscal condition of the welfare
state, such that a higher number of low skilled unemployed can be catered for by a
constant contribution rate. In total, the low skilled unemployment rate must rise,
which implies lower total low skilled employment, as the total number of low skilled
is constant. While the effects reverse for ρ < 0, both the WS and the BB-curve
remain unaffected for the Cobb-Douglas technology, as both the wage markup and
the fiscal condition depend on the low skilled unemployment rate only.
These insights have immediate implications for the effects of immigration on the
native unemployment rate uNL/(NL +NH).
Corrolary 1. When high and low skilled labor are close substitutes (complements),
high skilled immigration increases (decreases) the native unemployment rate, while
low skilled immigration decreases (increases) it.
This is a consequence of the native unemployment rate being a linear transforma-
tion of the low skilled unemployment rate. Empirical studies, focussing mostly on
the impact of low skilled immigrants on native unemployment, show no clear cut
results. While Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1993) find a small negative effect for
Germany and Hunt (1992) identifies a similar effect for France, such an effect seems
to be absent in other countries like Austria (Winter-Ebmer and Zweimu¨ller, 1997)
and Spain (Dolado, Jimeno and Duce, 1996).11
11 Some contributions focus on the effects of low skilled immigration on the economy-wide rather
than the native unemployment rate. Zimmermann (1995), e.g., finds a negative link between
the two variables in a cross-section of countries. In the present setup, it is easy to show
that the economy-wide unemployment rate must increase (decrease) when inputs are not close
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Welfare State Consequences
Maybe surprisingly, the consequences for the contribution rate to the unemployment
insurance scheme are less unambiguous than the employment effects:
Proposition 4. For ρ = 0, the contribution rate is independent of either type of
immigration. For ρ 6= 0, there exists a critical level of unemployment u˜ ∈ (0, 1),
such that low skilled immigration increases (decreases) the contribution rate for all
u < u˜ when inputs are close substitutes (complements), while the contribution rate
decreases (increases) for u > u˜:
sign
dτ
dML
= sign ρ [u˜− u]. (21)
The opposite holds for high skilled immigration:
sign
dτ
dMH
= sign ρ [u− u˜]. (22)
Proof. See Appendix.
The ambiguous behavior of the contribution rate is the result of differing relative
strengths of the shifts of both wage setting and budget balance relations. When
ρ > 0, the changing budgetary condition calls for a rise in τ , the extent of which
decreases in the low skilled unemployment rate. Wage setters’ reactions, however,
imply a reduction of the tax rate, which is the stronger, the more the marginal
employment rent is affected, that is, the higher is the low skilled unemployment
rate. Hence the reduction of the tax rate when unemployment is high. For ρ < 0,
the pattern reverses as wage setting implies an increase and the welfare state a
reduction of τ .
This means that starting from a high employment equilibrium (u > u˜), small scale
low skilled immigration reduces the tax rate for ρ > 0. However, as the unemploy-
ment rate declines, u may pass the critical level u˜ and the tax rate may increase
again. Whether this is the case depends on whether u˜ exceeds the minimum unem-
ployment rate u, which in turn hinges on the degree of labor market turnover and
substitutes and immigration is low (high) skilled. This holds because immigration affects the
proportion of the population subject to unemployment risk. For close substitutes, however, the
change in the low skilled unemployment rate works against this compositional effect, making
the overall impact ambiguous. Consistent with this, Gross (2002) detects a reduction of the
French unemployment rate due to low skilled immigration.
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trade union preferences. In a cross-section of countries, Razin, Sadka and Swagel
(2003) find low skilled immigration to have a negative effect on the income tax rate
and the level of social transfers. While that approach resorts to a politico-economic
interpretation of this phenomenon, we provide an alternative explanation based on
the existence of labor market distortions. In what follows, we will call unemployment
high (low) if u is above (below) u˜.
Corrolary 2. When inputs are close substitutes (complements), low skilled im-
migration decreases the relative size of the welfare state and increases the effective
replacement ratio r(τ) if and only if unemployment is high (low).
Proof. The share of GDP controlled by the government is:
τ(wL(1− u)(NL +ML) + wH(NH +MH))/Y = τ.
Hence, welfare state payments make up for a larger (smaller) fraction of GDP when-
ever the tax rate increases (decreases). Since r′(τ) < 0, the inverse relation holds
for the effective replacement ratio. ¤
Thus, although low skilled immigrants do not ”pay their way” because they are net
beneficiaries of the social safety net (Borjas, 1994), they may induce welfare state
adjustments that lead to both a better relative (but not absolute) protection of
the unemployed and a lower government’s share in GDP. Whether this is the case,
depends both on the degree of labor market distortions and technology.
Income and Utility Consequences
The labor market consequences of immigration play a contentious role when assess-
ing the impact on the economic position of natives. Since the seminal contribution
by Berry and Soligo (1969), total native income is the most popular measure for
the aggregate gain immigration provides for the host country.12 We also use this
measure, which amounts to:
TNI = (1− τ)wHH + (1− u)(1− τ)wLNL + ubNL
= wHNH +
NL
NL +ML
wLL+ τwHH
[
NL
NL +ML
− NH
NH +MH
]
. (23)
12 See, e.g. Schmidt et al. (1994), Razin & Sadka (1995), Fuest & Thum (2000).
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Total native income is the sum of native gross earnings plus immigrants’ net fiscal
contribution. The latter term is positive (negative) if and only if immigrants increase
(decrease) the share of high skilled in the economy.
Proposition 5. Marginal low (high) skilled immigration increases (decreases)
total native income for close substitutes when the contribution rate is not too high.
When high and low skilled labor are not close substitutes, marginal low (high) skilled
immigration decreases (increases) total native income.
Proof. The marginal effect of pure low skilled immigration on total native income
is:
∂TNI
∂ML
=
∂wH
∂L
dL
dML
NH − NLwLL
(NL +ML)2
+
NL
NL +ML
[
∂wL
∂L
L+ wL
]
dL
dML
+H
[
NL
NL +ML
− NH
NH +MH
] [
wHH
dτ
dML
+ τ
∂wH
∂L
dL
dML
NH
]
,
which for ML =MH = 0 reduces to:
NLwL
NL +ML
[
∂L
∂ML
− (1− u)
]
− τwHHNL
(NL +ML)2
. (24)
The second term is negative for τ > 0 and zero for τ = 0. The first term is positive
(negative) for ρ > (<)0. By continuity, the overall effect must be positive for ρ > 0
and some positive τ . The impact of a marginal high skilled immigrant is:
τwH + wL
∂L
∂H
,
such that a negative effect on total native income emerges for τ = 0 and ρ > 0. ¤
The first (marginal) low skilled immigrant exerts two effects on aggregate native
income. First, he earns wL(1 − u), his gross wage multiplied by the probability
of getting a job and raises total production by wL
∂L
∂ML
. This marginal employment
effect raises native factor earnings if and only if inputs are close substitutes. Second,
he is a net fiscal beneficiary of the welfare state, distracting resources from the
natives. However, this effect vanishes when τ = 0 while the first one is positive;
hence the overall impact must be positive when the tax rate is not too high. For
high skilled immigration, the opposite holds: when the tax rate is sufficiently low,
the net fiscal contribution is too low to compensate the reduction in low skilled
employment.
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We have thus identified situations where low skilled immigration increases total
native income, although the host country suffers from unemployment. However,
depending on the production structure, low skilled immigration can also be harmful
for the natives, even though wages are flexible and fiscal redistribution is low or even
absent (τ = 0).13
These effects differ substantially from those obtained under full employment. In a
setting formally comparable to the one presented here, Michael (2003) has shown
that marginal immigration must have a negative effect on total native income/welfare
when immigrants are net beneficiaries of the welfare state and the labor market is
perfectly competitive.14 The difference to the present result is easy to establish:
under full employment, the marginal employment effect is necessarily zero such that
only the fiscal redistribution effect is relevant.
While the above proposition was concerned with the effects of the marginal im-
migrant, the findings continue to hold for small scale immigration by continuity.15
However, with a larger inflow, the picture becomes more complex. Depending on
the evolution of factor supplies and the contribution rate, fiscal redistribution from
natives to immigrants can increase or decrease. However, the complementarity be-
tween the inputs lets the average product of each factor exceed its marginal product,
for which reason immigration of either type raises the remuneration of the other in-
put at the expense of the own wage. Since immigrants bear the more of this wage
decline the more enter the country, this factor remuneration effect adds to an over-
all positive effect for either type of immigration. While this is a finding well known
from the analysis of full employment economies (see, e.g. Berry and Soligo, 1969),
such models predict the total native gain from a given number of immigrants to be
increasing in the degree of factor complementarity:16 the factor remuneration effect,
determining the overall impact, is the stronger, the higher the difference between
the average and the marginal product of low skilled labor, that is, the degree of
13 Using wages as a proxy for income, some studies identify a negative overall effect of immigration
on all natives (Hunt, 1992, DeNew and Zimmermann, 1994). However, Pischke and Velling
(1994) arrive at just the opposite result.
14 See Michael (2003), proposition 1 for the case of no international capital mobility, which corre-
sponds to the number of high skilled being fixed in the present model.
15 While high skilled migration is typically quite limited in size, also low skilled immigration seems
to be much less than public opinion expects, see, e.g. Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) for the
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union.
16 Berry and Soligo (1969), footnote 7, provide a first informal statement of this point based on
the elasticity of labor demand. See also Borjas (1999), section 2.
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input complementarity. This does not hold in the present setup: The labor market
frictions generate a countervailing effect on employment probabilities reverting the
qualitative relation between factor complementarity and native income gains for at
least small scale immigration.
Of course, the public discussion about immigration policies is shaped not only by
the effect on the natives in the aggregate. Rather, the distribution of the gains and
losses among the population plays a decisive role, in particular when policies are
subject to a vote (Benhabib, 1996). Therefore, we elaborate on the distributional
consequences of immigration in detail.
Proposition 6. The effects of immigration on a native’s utility are in general
ambiguous. However, high skilled natives gain (lose) unambiguously from low skilled
immigration when inputs are close substitutes (complements) and unemployment is
high (low). Moreover, low (high) skilled immigration can increase (decrease) the
utility of each low skilled native, when inputs are close substitutes and effective
social protection is low.
Proof. Since the high skilled get a job with certainty, only the change in net
income is decisive:
∂IH
∂Mi
= − dτ
dMi
+ (1− τ)dwH
dMi
,
with i ∈ L,H. For low (high) skilled immigration, the second term is positive
(negative), while the sign of the first term is given by Proposition 4. Let VL =
(1− u)v((1− τ)wL) + u v(r(τ)(1− τ)wL) denote expected low skilled utility. Then:
dVL
dMi
=
du
dMi
[v(r(1− τ)wL)− v((1− τ)wL)]
+
[
(1− τ)∂wL
∂L
dL
dMi
− dτ
dMi
]
[(1− u)v′((1− τ)wL) + uv′(r(1− τ)wL)]
+r′(τ)(1− τ) dτ
dMi
uv′(r(1− τ)wL).
To show that low (high) skilled immigration can make a native low skilled better
(worse) off, apply a logarithmic utility function v(I) = log I, simplifying the above
derivative to:
dVL
dMi
=
du
dMi
log r(τ)− dτ
dMi
[
1
1− τ −
ur′(τ)
r(τ)
]
+
1− u
εL
− du
dMi
1
ε(1− u) .
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For ρ > 0 and i = L, the first term dominates when r(τ) is sufficiently low. Moreover,
the second term is positive when unemployment is high. Since sign du
dMH
= −sign du
dML
and sign dτ
dMH
= −sign dτ
dML
, native low skilled utility is decreasing in the number of
high skilled immigrants under those conditions. ¤
For the native high skilled, two effects arise: on the one hand, the factor remuner-
ation effect lets the gross wage increase or decrease, depending on whether immi-
gration makes their own factor relatively more scarce or abundant. On the other
hand, immigration affects the tax rate. This may either dampen or intensify the
gross wage effect, making the overall effect unambiguous only for some constella-
tions. While these arguments apply also to the low skilled, risk aversion introduces
some additional influences to be considered: Then, utility is not determined only
by expected income, but also by the distribution of income between the employed
and the unemployed state and the probability to enter these states. Low skilled
immigration influences all these parameters: it decreases the income in both states,
it changes the relative distance between net wage and benefit and it affects the
probability to become employed. The example presented in the proof of Proposition
5 shows that the latter effect has the potential to be dominant for ρ > 0. Then,
low skilled immigration reduces the probability to end up unemployed, which more
than compensates the loss of expected income whenever utility in the bad state of
unemployment is very low.17
A substantial part of the public debate on immigration policies is affected by the
positions of trade unions and employers. Therefore, we finally investigate the impact
of immigration on the wage bargaining surplus.
Proposition 7. For the Cobb-Douglas technology, low (high) skilled immigra-
tion increases (decreases) the wage bargaining surplus. The same holds for close
substitutability (complementarity), if unemployment is high (low).
Proof. Differentiate (4) with respect to Mi and MH , respectively and use (13) to
get:
∂Ω
∂Mi
= − γ
(1− τ)wL(1− ξ(u))(1− r(τ))
[
dτ
dMi
+
dw¯
dMi
]
.¤
17 While the proof has relied on logarithmic utility and benefits approaching zero, the same ar-
gument could be made for Stone-Geary preferences with benefits coming close enough to the
subsistence level.
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In their bargains, wage setters fail to internalize the effects immigration has on both
the contribution rate and the alternative wage. A decrease of the alternative wage
worsens the outside option, such that a given net wage provides a higher income
surplus. The same is true for a lower contribution rate. Thus, for economies with
close factor substitutability (complementarity) and high (low) unemployment rates,
wage setters must benefit from low skilled immigration, whereas an inflow of high
skilled labor provides them with a lower surplus.
We can thus conclude that in the empirically corrobated scenario of a close substi-
tutability between factors, low skilled immigration can be Pareto-improving: when
unemployment is high (u > u˜) and the contribution rate is not too high, both the
high and the low skilled natives as well as the wage setters can be better off. Un-
der the same conditions, high skilled immigration would have adverse consequences
on all natives. It should be emphasized that the possibility of Pareto-improving
or deteriorating immigration does not arise despite, but because of the existence of
unemployment. Low skilled immigration provides gains for the low skilled only if em-
ployment rises more than proportionally. But in an economy with full employment,
low skilled immigration is bound to have just a proportional employment effect. As
a consequence, the native low skilled must be harmed by the wage decrease induced
by stronger labor market competition.
IV. Conclusion
This contribution has shown that the effects of immigration to a host country with
labor market frictions depend crucially on the production structure. For the empir-
ically more relevant case of high and low skilled labor being close substitutes, low
skilled immigration is found to boost employment. Then, the low skilled unemploy-
ment rate falls, the total income accruing to natives increases, and the gains may be
distributed in a Pareto-improving way. High skilled immigrants, however, encourage
wage demands such that low skilled employment declines and natives as a whole can
get worse off. As a consequence, this paper puts some caution on the conventional
wisdom that high skilled immigration is preferable to low skilled immigration.
The findings of the paper can readily be applied to the case of emigration: For a
small-sized welfare state, low skilled emigration decreases the total income of those
left behind, while high skilled emigration has a positive aggregate effect. Hence, the
- Unemployment, Technology and the Welfare Effects of Immigration- 20
paper provides an explanation for positive effects of a brain drain, complementary
to studies emphasizing positive effects on skill formation (Mountford, 1997). With
migration flows being influenced by earnings differentials, however, increased mobil-
ity of the high skilled has much more mixed consequences: It is easy to devise of a
situation where the migration of high skilled hurts both the high tax home country
because of the loss in fiscal contributions, and the low tax host country because
of an increase in low skilled unemployment. An analogous reasoning holds for low
skilled migration from low to high redistribution countries.
Basically, all results continue to hold under some other welfare state designs like a
constant contribution rate or a constant net replacement rate policy.18 Also, the
analysis is not really affected when assuming that unions are interested only in
the employment of natives: Proposition 1 to 6 continue to hold. The only change
refers to Proposition 7, where the wage decline is not fully offset by the employment
increase, such that wage setters may be worse off from low skilled immigration in
the presence of close substitutability. However, it should be stressed that the wage
negotiation surplus comprises the interests of both trade unions and firms, where
the latter should be interested in total and not native employment. Also, once
immigrants have entered, trade unions have quite an interest to represent them in
order not to lose coverage and bargaining power.
The model has neglected physical capital which amounts to presuming perfect inter-
national capital mobility. With the interest rate pegged fixed, the above production
function can be regarded as the reduced form of a production function including
physical capital. Alternatively, one could reinterpret human capital as physical cap-
ital (Berry and Soligo, 1969, Benhabib, 1996), such that effects are driven by the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. On a qualitative basis, all re-
sults remain valid, the only exception being the distributional analysis. Then, the
net economic position of a native would depend on his relative endowment with
physical capital. However, the possibility of low skilled immigration creating a
Pareto-improvement is unaffected by this reinterpretation.19
18 However, note that the latter policy obscures the interaction between the welfare state and
low skilled employment, as the number of jobs would not depend on the contribution rate in
that very special case (Pissarides, 1998). Moreover, the labor market equilibrium would lose
its stability property for close substitutes. This nonwithstanding, the major difference to the
results presented above would be that the effects on the tax rate would be determined only by
shifts in the budget balance curve.
19 Actually, the congruence of personal and functional income distribution as presumed above is
the most unfavorable setting to achieve such an improvement.
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Native factor supplies were considered fixed. In a recent contribution, Casarico and
Devillanova (2003) argue that increases in the skill premium driven by low skilled
immigration create incentives to invest in education, thereby explaining the small
effects of immigration on wages and employment reported by a number of empirical
studies. The present approach adopts a rather pessimistic stance with respect to
educational adjustments. Nevertheless, beneficial effects for the natives are possible
here as well. Extensions of the model along the lines pursued by Casarico and
Devillanova (2003) are straightforward.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Differentiation of the system (12)-(13) with respect to
ML yields:
dτ
dML
=
τ
1− τ
1− u
u2
γε
(NL +ML) |D|
ρ
[
− α
1− α
(
NH +MH
(1− u)(NL +ML)
)ρ
pi(1− u)
1− (1− pi)(1− u) + 1
]
. (25)
Thus, dτ
dML
has a local extremum for u˜, implicitly defined by:
α
1− α
(
NH +MH
(1− u˜)(NL +ML)
)ρ
pi(1− u˜)
1− (1− pi)(1− u˜) = 1. (26)
Note, that all possible solutions to (26) imply an unemployment rate of less than
100%. The derivative of the term in square brackets in (25) is:
α/(1− α)pi
1− (1− pi)(1− u)
(
NH +MH
(1− u)(NL +ML)
)ρ [
−ρ+ 1
1− (1− pi)(1− u)
]
> 0.
Consequently, dτ
dML
is strictly convex or concave in u, depending on whether ρ is
positive or negative. Therefore, the solution to (26) is unique, and u˜ is a minimum
(maximum) of dτ
dML
when inputs are close substitutes (complements). Since:
dτ
dMH
=
τ
1− τ
1− u
u2
γε
(NL +ML) |D|
ρ
[
α
1− α
(
NH +MH
(1− u)(NL +ML)
)ρ
pi(1− u)
1− (1− pi)(1− u) − 1
]
, (27)
opposite effects emerge for high skilled immigration.¤
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